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Abstract
In this paper I attempt to analyze the construction of collective
identity of Muslims in America since September 11th to answer two
questions. How have the American Muslim movements emerged and
developed after September 11? How do they construct their identities
as Muslims in America?  I will demonstrate the dynamic and linkages
between the framing and constructing of collective identity of Muslims
in America at three levels: public discourse; persuasive
communication; and negotiations and consciousness raising during
episodes of collective action.  I will show how, for the overwhelming
majority of Muslims in the America, the Internet and Friday sermons
have become the major channels for constructing their collective
identity, politics, and movements.
Introduction
The issue “collective identity” seems to have intrigued many
scholars studying Muslims in several countries. (Bringa, 1995; Jacobson,
1998; Humphrey, 1998; and McGown, 1999). Yet, none of them focuses
on the collective identity of American Muslims. The issue has now become
especially important after the tragic event of September 11.
In this paper I attempt to analyze the construction of collective
identity of Muslims in America since September 11th to answer two
questions. How have the American Muslim movements emerged and
developed after September 11? How do they construct their identities as
Muslims in America?
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I would argue that after the September 11th attacks, the collective
identity of Muslims in America has formed through public discourse,
persuasive communication, and negotiations in the politicization of everyday
life. Not only did Muslims severely condemn the terrorists, but they also
created their boundaries within peace discourse: reinterpreting the meaning
of “Islam” and the concept of “Jihad” through various kinds of media.
Finally, the political consciousness of Muslim identity as an Umma-Muslim
community-has been raised through the Internet and Friday sermons,
particularly with regard to the policies toward the conflicts between Israel
and Palestine.
Methodology
There are several national Islamic organizations operating in North
America today. Each Islamic organization has its own unique history, and
their relevance to the lives of Muslim in America is great. They distribute
information on Islam to politicians; organize prayer times; advocate on
behalf of Muslim concerns; educate Muslim and non-Muslims about Islam;
and publish books, pamphlets, and magazines that guide the faithful in
their daily lives.
I rely on two key sources of data. First, websites of three Islamic
organizations: The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA)1; The Islamic
Circle of North America (ICNA)2; and Council on American-Islamic
Relations (CAIR)3.
My second data source consists of Khutbahs or Friday sermons
which are distributed weekly at the Muslim Association of Hawai’i.
According to Islamic teaching, Friday is the most prominent and the most
virtuous of the days. Friday Prayer is obligatory upon every Muslim, except
women, children, the sick, and travelers. A person who does not believe
in the obligatory status of the Friday Prayer falls outside the pale of Islam,
and one who abandons it due to negligence and careless, without a genuine
reason, becomes a sinner. The sermon will be delivered before the Friday
Prayer. The sermon in fact is meant to induce Muslims to offer devotions
and worship to Allah, thus, when the preacher comes forward to deliver
the sermon, then it is required for all Muslims not to engage in conversation.
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(Islahi, 2000a; 2000b).
I chose these three organizations because they are the three most
distinctive national Islamic organizations in the United States, and I also
attend and observe the Friday sermon regularly at the Muslim association
of Hawai’i.
The website of these organizations and the Friday sermons are
now becoming the public sphere of Muslim communities and play an
important role in framing American Muslims’ identities post-September
11th. The Khutbah is an important “weekly dose” of Islam, and in fact for
many it is the only Islamic contact they have in the entire week. The main
purposes of the Khutbah is to remind people of their Islamic duties and to
teach them about their religion.
Who are the Muslims in America?
According to the U.S. Department of State (2001), Islam is one
of the fastest- growing religions in the United States. By the year 2010,
America’s Muslim population is expected to surpass the Jewish population,
making Islam the country’s second-largest faith after Christianity. (Webb,
1995; Power, 1998; Esposito, 2002; Nimer, 2002)  While there are no
official population figures of religious affiliation in the United States, and
the estimates of the number of American Muslims vary from four to twelve
million, it is safe to say that there are at least four to six million. According
to the survey by Zogby International (2000), approximately a third of
American Muslims live in the East Coast (39%), 27% in the Central/
Great Lakes Region, 21% live in the South, and 13% in the West. The
same survey indicated that the ethnic origins of American Muslims are as
follow: 32% South Asia, 26% Middle East (Arab), 20% African American,
14% Other, 7% African, and 1% Not sure of ethnicity.
Muslims were present in America before the nineteenth century4.
The explorers, traders, and settlers who visited the new world from the
time of Columbus include Muslims. In addition, between 14 percent and
20 percent of African slaves brought to America between the sixteenth
and nineteenth centuries were Muslims, although they were forced to
convert to Christianity. Other Muslims, particularly Indians and Arabs,
46  Prajñâ Vihâra
who were not slaves also immigrated during this period and were able to
maintain their spiritual, cultural, and social identity.
The numbers of Muslims in America increased in the late nineteenth
century with the arrival of significant numbers of immigrants from the Arab
world (Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan). Then, after World War II, significant
numbers of immigrants from Palestine, who had lost their homes after the
creation of Israel in 1948, and elites from the Middle East and South Asia,
who sought either education or professional advancement, came to
America. African-American Muslims originated with the nation of Islam in
19305.
About two-thirds of the Muslims in America today are immigrants
or descendants of immigrants. Like many other immigrants of diverse
religious and ethnic backgrounds, Muslims have been challenged to define
their place in American and European society. They struggle with the
relationship of faith to national identity, intermarriage, gender relations,
worship, and education. Many struggle with the English language, as well
as their desire to hold on to their native or homeland cultures, and many
face religious and ethnic discrimination in the workplace and society.
Living as a minority in a dominant culture that is often ignorant
about Islam, many Muslims experience a sense of marginalization,
alienation, and powerlessness. Some Muslims are further marked as
“different” by their manner of dress, and they are sometimes singled out
for harassment. This has increasingly been the case since September 116.
Despite the fear and stress that Muslims suffered in the wake of the attacks,
many Islamic organizations and leaders have worked actively to overcome
the prejudice which come from either inside or outside Muslim communities.
Collective Identity of Muslims in America
“Identity” remains one of the most urgent - as well as hotly disputed
- topics in sociology and cultural studies. For nearly two decades, it has
been a central focus of debate for psychoanalytic, poststructuralist, and
cultural materialist criticism in areas ranging from postcolonial and ethnic
studies to feminism and queer theory. (Moya, 2000; Cerutti, 2001).
One of the most crucial elements in the history and development
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of a social group is the maintenance of its identity. The identity question is
central to the Muslim presence in the United States. American Muslims
are experiencing both exhilaration at the opportunity to increase their
numbers and develop their institutions and frustration and dismay as they
continue to experience prejudice, intimidation, discrimination,
misunderstanding, and even hatred. (Haddad, 1991). It is increasingly
important, therefore, to take a fresh look at some of the ways in which
they have constructed their collective identity and establishing an Islamic
community in the United States especially after the September 11 attacks.
Bert Klandermans (1992) develops the concept of social
construction of meaning in action situations. He refers to the processes of
interpreting, defining, and consciousness raising that occurs among
participants who interact during episodes of collective action. For
Klandermans, an important aspect of the social construction is the
construction of an injustice frame: situations are defined as unjust and
grievances are transformed into demands. He proposes three levels of
meaning construction:
1) the level of public discourse, at which collective identity is
formed and transformed;
2) the level of persuasive communication conducted by movement
organizations, their opponents, and countermovement
organizations; or
3) the level of consciousness raising during episodes of collective
action.
Alberto Melucci (1995) defines collective identity as a process of
“constructing” an action system. For Melucci, collective identity is an
interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals (or groups)
and concerned with the orientations of action and the field of opportunities
and constraints in which the action take place.
Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier (1992; 1995) have
conceptualized collective identity as consisting of three interrelated
processes : the construction of group boundaries that establish differences
between a challenging group and dominant group; consciousness consists
of the interpretive frameworks that emerge out of a challenging group’s
struggle to define and realize its interests; and the negotiation or
politicization of everyday life encompasses the symbols and everyday
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actions subordinate groups use to resist and restructure existing systems
of domination.
To many Muslims, the September 11th attacks also represented a
major challenge in their struggle for acceptance as a community with a
distinct religious identity. In that regard, Muslims in America have witnessed
the good, the bad, and the ugly. ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’ now became a
major topic of public discourse in America.
The question is: how they create their boundaries, position
themselves, or take actions in response to this public discourse? To this
extent, Klandermans, Melucci and Taylor and Whittier’s works provide a
good framework for understanding the process of the construction of
Muslim identity in America.
Public Discourse on the Collective Identity of Muslims in America
Bert Klandermans (1992) suggests that media discourse has
become a crucial element in this evolutionary process.
There is no doubt that whoever the terrorists were who attacked
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon building on September 11, the
attacks put all Muslims in a state of shock. All media attempted to relate
the attacks to Islamic fundamentalism. As a Muslim, I still remember my
triple suffering I experienced while watching the horrific events unfold on
television. I first suffered at seeing the deaths of the innocent people in the
World Trade Center who did not even have the opportunity to know why.
Second, I suffered when I witnessed the television coverage of Muslim
women in Palestine celebrating the attacks7. Third, I was stunned when I
opened my internet and found the hateful words directed at Muslims. I
experienced all three events at the same time, and like many others around
the country, I felt my heart sink, my throat tighten and my eyes fill with
tears.
Along with major media organizations, mainline Protestants and
Catholics as well as members from the Black, Latino, Asian, and Jewish
communities have favored a position that distinguished between extremists
and mainstream Muslims. On the other hand, some Christian conservatives
and pro-Israel zealots have actively sought to drive a wedge between
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Muslims and the nation. Members of these groups revived the defunct
‘clash of civilizations’ thesis and have actively worked for the exclusion of
Muslims from public forums, while continuing to argue for anti-Muslim
public policies.
 These are just a few examples of why Muslims were disheartened
by the vitriol from the far right wing and anti-Muslim elements.
At an annual gathering of the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC)
in June 2002 in St. Louis, the Rev. Jerry Vines, pastor of First Baptist
Church of Jacksonville and a former SBC vice president, told SBC
conventioneers that the Prophet Mohammad was a “demon-possessed
pedophile.” Televangelist Pat Robertson, speaking on his Christian
Broadcasting Network’s ‘700 Club’ program in February 20028,
described a veritable infestation of America with violent, subversive
Muslims. He chose to blast President George W. Bush’s position on Islam
as well. He said “I have taken issue with our esteemed president in regard
to his stand in saying Islam is a peaceful religion…It’s just not. And the
Qur’an makes it very clear, if you see an infidel, you are to kill him.”
Repeatedly, evangelist Franklin Graham, son of the renowned
Reverend Billy Graham, called the Islamic religion “wicked, violent and
not of the same God.” He also said “I don’t believe this is a wonderful,
peaceful religion…when you read the Qur’an and you read the verses
from the Qur’an, it instructs the killing of the infidel, for those that are
non-Muslim.”
To protect their collective identity, various Muslim groups and
scholars responded to those public discourses. (CAIR, 2002). Muslims
exposed the distortion of the Qur’an, which permits defensive struggles
but calls for peace when aggression ends. On the issue of a Muslim’s
friendship with people of other faiths, Muslims reminded the public by
distributing news release that a number of verses support cordial relations
with anyone who does not attack their faith. These include “ O ye who
believe! Take not for friends and protectors those who take your religion
for a mockery or sport…” (Qur’an, 5: 57); “God only forbids you to
make friendship with those who fought you on an account of your faith
and drove you out of your homes and backed up others in your expulsion.”
(Qur’an, 60:9).
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Media Promotion of Tolerance
It is important to note the stark contrast between the anti-Muslim tone of
several conservative media personalities and other reporters who took a
more balanced approach in their coverage of September 11. Among the
commentators who engaged in Muslim bashing were Sean Hannity and
Bill O’Reilly of Fox News, Rich Lowry of the National Review, Dr.
Laura Schlesinger, Rush Limbaugh, Cal Thomas, and Allen Keys. However,
several media outlets have made an effort to draw a clear distinction
between Islam and terrorism. They have also been vigilant on the issue of
civil liberties. Here is an example:
*  Oprah Winfrey Show, October 5, 2001
The one-hour, widely watched NBC program gave a crash course
on Islam that was generally balanced. It introduced the main beliefs of
Islam and featured an American Muslim couple practicing their faith and
going about their daily lives in Chicago.
Most of the American public professed generally a negative
impression of Muslims and Arabs in America shortly after the attacks.
However, Muslims in America sympathized with some balancing views in
the media. The most extensive post September 11th poll on Americans’
view on Islam, jointly sponsored by the ABC television network and the
belief net religion news website, was conducted on January 6, 2002. The
poll revealed that the percentage of Americans with a favorable view of
Islam had dropped slightly, while the percentage with an unfavorable view
of Islam had also dropped. (CAIR, 2002).
Americans Lend Hands to their Muslim Neighbors
There were several instances of Americans from various faith
communities coming to the aid of Muslims in the wake of the violent post
9/11 backlash. Jennifer Schock, 31, a Web designer from Fairfax, Virginia,
sprang into action upon learning that some American Muslim women started
leaving their head scarves at home out of fear for their safety. Schock and
other non-Muslim women around the USA began donning scarves
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themselves as a sign of solidarity with their Muslim sisters. Through the
Internet9, they established a global network called Scarves for Solidarity
to support the right of Muslim women to choose their headwear without
fearing retaliation.
Muslim community centers reported many spontaneous acts of
kindness from members of the public. Within a week after the attacks,
Islamic centers in San Diego received bouquets of flower and cards of
support and sympathy from members of other faith groups—specially
after reports of Muslim women being afraid to leave home.
One measure of this support is surveys targeting Muslim community
members. In an August 2002 CAIR survey, about 80 percent of 945
respondents said they have experienced kindness or support from friends
or colleagues of other faiths. (In contrast, 57 percent said they have
experienced anti-Muslim bias or discrimination).
According to Taylor and Whittier (1992; 1995), boundaries mark
the social territories of group relations by highlighting differences between
activists and the web of others in the contested social world. I find that
Muslims in America use public discourse as constructing their boundary
of asserting “who we are.” Boundary markers are, therefore, central to
the formation of collective identity of Muslims in America because they
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promote a heightened awareness of a group’s commonalities and frame
interaction between members of the in-group members and the out-group
members.
Persuasive Communication
The social construction of protest proceeds in the context of
mobilization and counter mobilization campaigns, as different actors in
social conflict try to persuade individual citizens to take their side. According
to Bert Klandermans (1997: 89), unlike public discourse and the process
through which collective identities are formed and transformed, the
construction of meaning at this level involves deliberate attempts to influence
beliefs. Movement organizations, opponents, and countermovement
organizations alike try to convince the individual that they are right.
Organizers are “social reconstructionists,” they construct an alternative
view of social reality.
Within hours of the first plane hitting the World Trade Center on
September 11, American Muslim organizations issued a joint statement
condemning the terrorist attacks, including the Islamic Society of North
America (ISNA), Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), and Muslim
American Society (MSA). The statement read in part:
American Muslims utterly condemn what are vicious and cowardly acts
of terrorism against innocent civilians. We join with all Americans in
calling for the swift apprehension and punishment of the perpetrators.
No political cause could ever be assisted by such immoral acts. (CAIR,
2002).
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) sponsored a full-
page advertisement in the Washington Post on September 16, 2001,
condemning the attacks and expressing gratitude to the rescue workers
and condolences to the families of the victims.
Islamic organizations and leaders then reached out to other faith
communities to condemn terrorism in solidarity with one another, together
with other major Christian groups such as the National Conference of
Catholic Bishops.
The statements from notable scholars making clear the distinction
between Islam and terrorism flow out via the Internet. Sheikh Yusuf al-
Qaradawi, one of the most respected leaders of Sunni Islam, denounced
the attacks against civilians and encouraged Muslims to donate blood to
the victims of the attack. He issued a statement saying that “Our hearts
bleed for the attacks that have targeted the World Trade Center, as well
as other institutions in the United States despite our strong positions to the
American biased policy towards Israel on the military, political, and
economic fronts. Islam is the religion of tolerance, holds the human soul in
high esteem, and considers the attack against innocent human beings a
great sin.”10 This is backed by the Qur’an verse which reads:
who so ever kills a human being for other than manslaughter or corruption
in the earth , it shall be as if he has killed all mankind, and who so ever
saves the life of one, it shall be as if he had saved the life of all mankind.’
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(Qur’an, 5: 32).
After September 11 attacks, Islamic leaders of every organization
promptly reconstruct the meaning of “Islam” to distinguish themselves from
terrorists. They actively readdress the “peace discourse” in Islam as a
distinctive concept of Muslim identity. We can find statements and articles
about “peace discourse” on the Internet and also the Friday  sermons.
For examples, Hakim Quansafi, president of the Muslim Association of
Hawai’i, preaches at the Friday sermon, and news release at the website
that “Islam is a continuation of all the morals of all the religions. It is a
religion of the prophet Abraham and all the prophets, which means
submission to God. Islam means peace. We the Muslims in Hawai’i
condemn in the strongest possible terms what are apparently vicious and
cowardly acts of terrorism against innocent civilians. We offer our
condolences and prayers to the victims and their families for this horrific
tragedy.”11
Maulana Wahidulddin Khan, a distinctive Muslim scholar, states
in an Islamic website that “Islam is a religion which teaches non-violence.
According to the Qu’ran, God does not love ‘Fasad’ or violence or
terrorism. On the other hand, non-violence should never be confused with
inaction or passivity. Non-violence is an action in the full sense of the
word. Rather it is more forceful an action than that of violence. It is the
fact that non-violent activism is more powerful and effective than violent
activism.”12
All websites  reconstruct the concept of “jihad” which is always
misunderstood in the public discourse. They try to argue that “jihad” is
one of the most misunderstood and abused aspects of Islam. There are
some Muslims who exploit and misuse this concept for their own political
objectives. There are many non-Muslims who misunderstand it or use it
to discredit Islam and Muslims.13
The Arabic term “jihad” usually translates into European languages
as “holy war,” more on the basis of its juridical usage in Islam than on its
much more universal meaning in the Qur’an and Hadith, which is derived
from the root ‘john’ whose primary meaning is to strive or to exert oneself.
Jihad means serious and sincere struggle on the personal as well as the
social level. It refers to struggles to do good and to remove injustice,
54  Prajñâ Vihâra
oppression and evil from society. This struggle should be spiritual as well
as social, economic and political.
The events of September 11 were followed by a surge of public
interest in Islam and Muslims. Ordinary people wanted to know what
Muslims thought of the attacks; others began wondering about the intentions
of Muslims in their midst. Muslims in America quickly realized that the
best way to allay fear, prevent further damage to America’s well being,
and preserve the society’s unity was to reach out to their neighbors to an
unprecedented degree. The American Muslims outreach to the rest of the
country has been noteworthy for its unusual degree of openness, observed
the Los Angeles Times on September 30, 2001. Mosques opened their
doors, Muslims conducted educational programs and Islamic organizations
and centers launched media and advertising campaigns to communicate
with their fellow Americans.
According to Melucci (1995), collective identity is a process
referring to a network of active relationships between actors, who interact,
communicate, influence each other, negotiate, and make decisions. During
this process, we have seen the model of leadership, communicative
channels, and technologies of communication which  constitute parts of
this network of relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in America.
Negotiations and Consciousness-Raising during Episodes of
Collective Action
Bert Klandermans (1992: 93) suggests that once individuals
become involved in an episode of collective action their view of the world
may change dramatically. They acquire new collective identities as
participants in collective action. These new identities, however, do not
necessarily represent a disjunction with the past, since they evolve from
beliefs an individual already shared with the collective.
Observing the Friday sermons and e-mail released to Muslims in
America, I find that Muslims’ consciousness has been raised during the
episode of collective actions.
Not only do they criticize the terrorists attacks, but also criticize
American companies supporting Israeli government in killing Palestinian
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people. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, again, issued a decree during his
Khutbah that consuming goods from American companies is forbidden
for Muslims because those companies support Israel through the U.S.
government.
On delivering a Friday sermon, Hakim Quansafi, the president of
Hawaii Muslim Association, addressed Muslims in Hawai’i that according
to CIA report, Muslims are the heaviest smokers of the world, and each
year cigarettes contribute $400 million dollars in taxes which in turn goes
to support  Israeli militarism. So, Muslims who smoke are supporting
Israel to kill innocent people in Palestine14. And on March 2002, the
association also conducted a peace rally for Palestinian peoples in front of
the state capital of Hawai’i.
Moreover, ‘American Muslims for Global Peace and Justice’
delivered an article, “Global Action Alert #1 Boycott Starbucks: You might
save a life In Palestine,” to all American Muslim organizations15. The
message states that:
For American Muslim point of view, despite the current onslaught
undertaken by Israel against the Palestinian people, Starbucks CEO
Howard Schultz is fueling an already tense situation by using inflamed
language to “legitimize” Israel’s actions. American Muslims for Global
Peace and Justice (Global Peace) calls on all Muslims and all people of
conscience to boycott the Starbucks Coffee Company regarding Starbucks
also plans on opening several shops in Israel, which amounts to the
funding of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian people in much the
same way that U.S. tax dollars sent to Israel help fund the armory used to
kill and besiege Palestinians.
The website called on Muslims to take action world wide to refuse
to support Starbucks’ stance by not buying their products.
Tell Schultz and his company that you will not support such insightful
remarks at a time when people are being killed on a daily basis as a result
of the ongoing aggression by the Israeli army. Starbucks has over 3,000
stores worldwide, so we are calling on Muslims to take up this boycott in
every city, in every neighborhood where Starbucks operates. We ask that
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this Action Alert be translated into other languages and distributed in
countries worldwide. Stop drinking Starbucks coffee, and make sure you
tell them why you have stopped.
According to Taylor and Whittier’s (1992; 1995) concept of
negotiation or politicization of everyday life, the action alert in refusing
to support Starbucks on Muslims’ websites, or the calling on Friday sermon
to stop smoking are a type of negotiation central to the construction of
politicized collective identity of Muslims in America. It calls attention to
self-transformation which aims primarily at the individual level, and
renegotiates the meaning of “Muslim” as an antagonist to the dominant
power.
Conclusion
In this paper I have attempted to illustrate the social construction
of Muslim identities in America in the aftermath of September 11. According
to the data from the websites of a few national Islamic organizations in
America and Friday sermons, we have seen the dynamic and linkages
between the framing and constructing of collective identity of Muslims in
America at three levels: public discourse; persuasive communication; and
negotiations and consciousness raising during episodes of collective action.
In the public discourse, for the most part, American media coverage
of Muslims and events in the Muslim world concentrates on the sensational.
Greg Noakes (1998), in “Muslim and the American Press” maintains that
the media propensity for the ‘sensational,’ the explosive of headline events,
acts of violence, a religious extremism capture the headlines at the expense
of the faith and practice of vast majority of Muslims. Undoubtedly, the
failures or limitations of American media reporting on Islam and Muslims
have an impact on the sensibilities and sensitivities of Muslim in America,
especially in the aftermath of September 11 attacks. This level is important
as a starting point for constructing collective action among Muslims in
America.
To this extent, we have seen the persuasive communication level.
All Muslim organizations in America redefine the meaning of ‘Islam” and
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“jihad” to “peace discourse,” to distinguish themselves from the terrorists
and open their communities to the public.
Finally, the consciousness of Muslim’s Umma (unity) has been
raised, and takes peaceful action against American companies which
support Israel in killing Palestinians, and finally, these organizations have
gradually become a part of anti-war movement in America.
To Muslims in America, the September 11 attacks represented a
major challenge in their struggle for acceptance as a community with a
distinct religious identity. Interestingly, the Friday sermon and the Internet
have hence become a dominant force both in terms of how they represent
themselves and how the ‘other’ is represented to them. And how do other
aspects of identity influence the term of religious discourse on the Internet?
There are also those who argue that the Internet has had a moderating
effect on Islamist discourse. Sa’ud al-Faqih, for example, believes that
Internet website, chat-rooms, and discussion forums devoted the debate
concerning Islam and politics serve to encourage greater tolerance. He
believes that in these new arenas, one sees a greater convergence in the
center of Islamists’ political spectrum and a weakening of the extremes.
(Mandaville, Peter, 2001). Thus for the overwhelming majority of Muslims
in America, the Internet and Friday sermons are major channels for
constructing their collective identity, politics,  and movements within Islam.
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ENDNOTES
1 ISNA is the most well-known Muslim organization. It acts as an umbrella
group for many local mosques and associations.
2 ICNA is an offshoot of ISNA founded by immigrants from the Indian
subcontinent. It has chapters in many major cities and engages in charity work and
missionary efforts.
3 CAIR Muslim public affairs organization that work to confront
discrimination, influence politics, and educate people about Islam.
4 see a collection of essays and research findings on the emerging Muslim
communities in the United States of America in Sulayman Nyang (1999).
5 Initially it differed significantly from mainstream Islam in its doctrines of
black militancy and separatism and its theology.  Since the mid-1970s, under the
leadership of Warith Deen Muhammad the bulk of the nation of Islam has been
integrated into mainstream Islam. See Black American Muslims Movements in
Edward Curtis IV, 2002, Eric Lincoln, 1994, Lewis Baldwin and Amiri AL-Hadid,
2002, and Yahiya Emerick (2002).
6 the report on one year after 9-11by CAIR insists that the 9-11 attacks
were followed by a dramatic rise in anti-Muslim hate crimes. CAIR received 1,717
reports of harassment, violence and other discriminatory acts in the first six months.
7 I knew later that the picture was another event during the gulf war on
1992.
8 Website: http://www.cbn.com.
9 Website: http://www.interfaithpeace.org.
10 Website: http://www.iio.org/.
11 http://www.iio.org/, September 12, 2001.
12 http://saif_w.tripod.com.
13 http://www.isna.net/; http://www.icna.org/; http://www.cair-net.org;
and http://www.iio.org/.
14 Friday sermon at the Islamic Center of Hawai’i, 25 January 2002.
15 http://www.globalpeaceandjustice.org.
Suchart Setthamalinee  59
REFERENCES
Bringa, Tone. 1995. Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a
Central Bosnian Village. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Cerutti, Furio. 2001. “Political Identity and Conflict: A Comparison of Definitions.”
in Identities and Conflicts: the Mediterranean. Cerutti, Furio and R.
Rainier (eds.). Great Britain: Algrave Publishers, Pp.9-25.
Esposito, John. 2002. What Everyone needs to know about Islam. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Haddad, Yvonne. 1991. “Introduction: The Muslims of America.” in Haddad, Yvonne
(ed). The Muslims of America. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp.3-10.
Jacobson, Jessica. 1998. Islam in Transition: Religion and Identity among British
Pakistani Youth. London and New York: Routledge.
Klandermans, Bert. 1992. “The Social Construction of Protest and
Multiorganizational fields.” in Morris, Aldon and Carol Mueller (eds.).
Frontiers in Social Movement Theory. New Haven CT: Yale University
Press, Pp.77-103.
Humphrey, Michael. 1998. Islam Multiculturalism and Transnationalism: From
the Lebanese Diaspora. New York: St Martin’s Press and Toronto. Canada:
University of Toronto Press.
Islahi, Muhammad. 2000a. Etiquette of Life in Islam. New Delhi: Markazi Maktaba
Islami Publishers.
                              . 2000b. Everyday Fiqh. New Delhi: Markaba Zikra.
McGown, Rima. 1999. Muslims in the Diaspora: The Somali Communities of London.
Melucci, Alberto. 1995. “The Process of Collective Identity.” in Hank Johston and
Bert Klandermans (eds). Social Movements and Culture: Social
Movements, Protest &Contention. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, Pp.41-63.
Moya, Paula. 2000. “Introduction: Reclaiming Identity.” in Moya Paula and Michael
Hames-Garcia (eds.). Reclaiming Identity: Realistic Theory and the
predicament of Postmodernism. Berkeley, C.A.: University of California
Press, Pp.1-28.
Nyang, Sulayman. 1999. Islam in the United States of America. United States of
America: ABC International Group, Inc..
Nimer, Mohamed. 2002. “Muslims in American Public Life.”  in Yvonne Haddad.
Muslim in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens. New York: Oxford
University Press, Pp.169-186.
Noakes, Greg. 1998. “Muslims and the American Press.” in Haddad, Yvonne and
Esposito, John. Muslims on the Americanization Path?. Florida: Scholars
Press.
Power, Carla. 1998. “The New Islam.” Newsweek, March 16, p.34.
Taylor, Verta, and Nancy Whittier. 1995. “Analytical Approach to Social Movement
Culture: The Culture of the Women’s Movement.” in Hank Johston and
60  Prajñâ Vihâra
Bert Klandermans (eds). Social Movements and Culture: Social
Movements, Protest & Contention. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, Pp.163-187.
                              . 1992. “Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities:
Lesbian Feminist Mobilization.” in Morris, Aldon and Carol Mueller (eds.).
Frontiers in Social Movement Theory. New Haven CT: Yale University
Press, Pp.104-129.
U.S. Department of State. 2001. Islam in the United States: Official State Department
Fact Sheet. http://www.state.gov/.
Webb, Gisela. 1995. “Expressions of Islam in America.” in Timothy Miller. America’s
Alternative Religions. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Zogby International. 2001. American Muslim Poll. November-December 2001.
Websites
The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), http://www.isna.net.
The Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), http://www.icna.org.
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), http://www.cair-net.org.
The Muslim Association of Hawaii, http://www.iio.org.
Suchart Setthamalinee  61
